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Discussion
Philosophers in Search of Life...

David A. White *
If, after reading the above title, someone has ventured this far—the opening sentence—then
he or she has doubtless conquered any urge to dismiss the contents of this piece (and do
something else...) because the title is so blatantly silly. Only a philosopher would be so sadly
quixotic as to feel a need to become involved in a “search” for life. Dwelling in the realm
of the living is where we humans spend all our waking hours. Furthermore, all of us settle
into sleep for a greater or lesser amount of time and once in that state (discounting the
differentiating factor of dreams), we exhibit the practical necessity of rest and a general
quieting of the demands of consciousness—remaining alive throughout. Life is everywhere.
What point would be served by identifying it as an object of philosophical interest and
concern?
A recent article by Robert Zaretsky in the The Chronicle of Higher Education (6
December 2015) poses this question. Zaretsky relates an experience he had with Pierre
Hadot’s book, What is Ancient Philosophy? (Harvard, 2002). Hadot’s thesis is that ancient
philosophers, from the pre-Socratics through to the Hellinistic period, were not primarily
interested in constructing grand theoretical accounts of reality and how we know it;
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rather, they aimed at affecting how their contemporaries—and, presumably, posterity–led
their lives. Here is an elegant summary taken from the Hadot’s concluding chapter,
“Questions and Perspectives”:
We must discern the philosopher’s underlying intention, which
was not to develop a discourse which had its end in itself but to act
upon souls. In fact, each assertion must be understood from the
perspective of the effect it was intended to produce in the soul of the
auditor or reader. Whether the goal was to convert, to console, to
cure, or to exhort the audience, the point was always and above all not to
communicate to them some ready-made knowledge but to form them. In
other words, the goal was to learn a type of know-how; to develop a
habitus, or new capacity to judge and to criticize; and to transform–
that is, to change people’s way of living and of seeing the world.
(Hadot, 274–all italics in text)
Zaretsky’s Chronicle account is a vivid report, based on various personal
experiences and inquiries, testifying to the conclusion that if Hadot was right and ancient
philosophy intended “to change people’s way of living and of seeing the world,” this goal
does not strike much of a chord in the prose efforts of current academic philosophers or,
more generally, in their range of professional interests. But it does sound a great deal
like commonly pursued goals for what is dubbed “self-help” literature.

I: LET’S HELP OURSELVES TO A LITTLE WISDOM
Gretchen Rubin may not be a familiar name in contemporary philosophical circles but she
is well-known in the self-help arena. She has written two best-selling books on
happiness—The Happiness Project (2009) and Happier at Home (2012). Her most recent
publication, and the work which will occupy us here, is Better Than Before: What I
Learned about Making and Breaking Habits...(2015). Before she began to write, Rubin
earned degrees from Yale and then clerked for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor; for those
who want additional credentials of an academic cast, the motto which heads the
Introduction to Rubin’s book on habits is a quotation from Whitehead’s An
Introduction to Mathematics. This book has been out for less than a year (as of this writing)
and has received over 400 reviews on Amazon. We may safely assume that what Gretchen
Rubin says and how she says it represent vanguard literary expressions in the self-help
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genre.
Better Than Before and its author were featured in the 22 March 2015 issue of
Parade, a popular weekly supplement which appeared for many years in American
newspapers; the quotations given below are taken from this account. Here is a thought
which, for Rubin, encapsulates her basic goal in Better Than Before: “Think about the habit
that you want to form and then think, What’s everything I could do to set myself up for
success?” Readers immersed in the dense thickets of academic philosophy may initially
shrug at the above—after all, what does this sentiment and the other, often syrupy
thoughts common to self-help books have to do with any of their mountain-top, rigorously
developed concerns? Even if Rubin knows a smidgen of Whitehead, what reason is there to
pay serious attention to whatever she says about habits?

II: ARISTOTLE AGREES....
One reply which might help deflect this dismissive attitude appears in Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics. At the end of chapter I of book II (1103b23ff), we read (Rackham’s
translation):
In a word, our moral dispositions are formed as a result of the
corresponding activities. Hence it is incumbent on us to control the
character of our activities, since on the quality of these depends the
quality of our dispositions. It is therefore not of small moment whether
we are trained from childhood in one set of habits or another; on the
contrary it is of very great, or rather of supreme, importance.
Indeed, as Aristotle comments by way of preamble at the beginning of chapter I, moral virtue
is the product of “habit” which in Greek—ἔθος—transliterates into “ethics” itself.
Aristotle’s testimony thus underlines the seminal importance of habits. Although the
passage cited concentrates on pointing out the need to establish right habits from childhood
through one’s adulthood, it is easy to reason that if one wanted to change a habit ingrained
from youth for purposes of improving one’s hold on avenues to happiness, Aristotle
would fully support such personal modification.
In fact, Aristotle’s affinity to the very core of a self-help agenda emerges in his
immediate thought after emphasizing (in the above passage) the importance of having the
right habits. The opening lines of chapter II assert (1103b26ff):
As then our present study, unlike the other branches of philosophy, has a
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practical aim (for we are not investigating the nature of virtue for the
sake of knowing what it is, but in order that we may become good,
without which result our investigation would be of no use), we have
consequently to carry our enquiry into the region of conduct, and to ask
how we are to act rightly....
Hadot does not mention this passage in his discussion of Aristotle’s approaches to
dimensions of human life as lived philosophically but the vigor with which Aristotle states
the foundational value of practicality—that everything laid out theoretically in the account
of “the nature of virtue” in the Nicomachean Ethics is directly intended so that “we
may become good” since otherwise our investigation “would be of no use”—is
remarkable in its undeniable embrace of “self-help” motivation. If therefore Rubin and
Aristotle intersect at some juncture in their analysis of habits and considerations pertaining to
them (indeed, Rubin cites “reading Aristotle” in the subtitle of the first of her two books on
happiness), we seem fully justified in applying Aristotelian modes of thought within a selfhelp context if his reflections enhance and deepen Rubin’s descriptions and
recommendations.

III: HABITS ARE HARD TO FORM–I NEED A BREAK....
Rubin’s approach to habits and their formation blends speculative generalization and
practical advice, the descriptive and the prescriptive. For Rubin, “[t]he more [things] you can
make into a habit, then the less you have to drain yourself using your willpower.” If,
however, “...you are constantly pushing out and nothing is coming in, then you’re not
going to be able to stick to these habits when they’re a little challenging.” But there is a
practical solution to the threat of falling short with regard to establishing a new habit: “Treats
are a way to give yourself that energy that you need to keep going.”
This interjection is eminently practical and makes good discretionary sense. A
treat is a certain kind of pleasure. But it is an incremental pleasure both by itself as well as
when juxtaposed with the intended goal, i.e., the implementation of a habit. Now Aristotle
observes that the moral agent does not want to pursue a life of virtue by abstaining from
pleasure entirely, to the point of becoming “insensible” (1104a24). For Aristotle, pleasure
is an integral feature of human life; the challenge is to experience pleasures but to do so in
the right way. Are treats a legitimate strategy as far as developing a desirable habit is
concerned? Yes. In fact, if we read this section of Aristotle from the standpoint of the
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connection between treats and habits, we see Aristotle developing a position which
reinforces the prudential value of this advice, a sort of Moral Morphology of Treats.

IV: JUST ONE CAN’T HURT....
In book II of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle characterizes moral virtue as “continuous
and divisible” (1106b26). Now if the various types of virtue are concerned with actions
and every action is accompanied by some measure of pleasure and pain, then “for this
reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasure and pain” (1104b13ff). Therefore, if
moral virtue is continuous and if the spectrum of pleasure and pain always be present in
the exercise of moral virtue, then we may conclude that as integral elements in moral virtue,
pleasure and pain are themselves continuous. Finally, an assertion which is classic in the
Aristotelian account of virtue and the experience of pleasure and pain as necessary
components in the exercise of virtue; this is also one of the passages which has grounded the
oft-quoted adages “everything in moderation” and “nothing in excess”:
...in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little,
and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with
reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right
motive, and in the right way, is what is intermediate and best, and this is
characteristic of virtue. (1106b18–24)
Pleasure is continuous; this means that if an experience is felt throughout a segment of
time as pleasant (e.g., savoring one’s favorite food while in the act of eating), then the
experience of pleasure can be divided into smaller segments without affecting the
distinctive pleasurable quality of that experience. A treat, if understood as a small pleasure,
is therefore inherently pleasant for the simple reason that it is an instance of a type of
experience providing pleasure for the individual. A treat characterized as a “lesser
pleasure” is no less a pleasure than a “greater pleasure”: it may differ in terms of intensity
or duration or quality but these differences do not affect its “hedonic” nature (and, as should
go without saying, it would be a fundamental error in rhetorical technique to use a word
like “hedonic” in a proposed literary rendition of lived philosophy and practicality if
aimed at benefitting a general audience! We will say more on such rhetorical choices in
Section VI below).
Rubin contends that if establishing a habit is becoming a slog, treats will give the
individual seeking to form a habit the “energy” to keep going. In general, to form a
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habit is either to do something one has not done before (e.g., address chores and tasks
immediately, without procrastination) or not to do something one had done before (e.g.,
consume too much of a favorite food). Understanding how a treat punctuates the latter type
of habit will afford an intriguing exercise in applied Aristotle and will show how this notion
of energy becomes interestingly and relevantly complex.
A treat is not pleasant just because the individual has decided to allow herself
to enjoy something which, given the decision to instill a habit which controls a pleasurable
intake, should not have occurred. This approach effectively reduces a treat to a type of “guilty
pleasure.” Experienced in this way, it is not evident that the pleasure produced by the treat
has overridden the guilt arising from the realization that the process of gaining a habit has
been disrupted, perhaps to the point of nullifying all previous efforts to achieve that end.
As we have seen, however, even if the pleasure derived from a treat is somehow
reduced in intensity and duration, it remains a pleasure. This follows from Aristotle’s
position regarding pleasure as a continuum. Thus even if the experience of pleasure from
the treat is inflected with a thin veil of guilt—“I really shouldn’t have this little bit of (insert
favorite treat here), but I deserve a treat for doing so well forming this habit”—the overall
experience is and remains pleasant. Indeed, a moment’s reflection should eliminate any
residual “guilt” associated with the enjoyment in question, i.e., as a momentary lapse from
observance of the habit’s natural parameters. But even if the power of reflection does not
dissolve this negative feeling, the continuousness inherent in sensed pleasure allows the
experience of a treat to be combined with a number of other feelings and remain distinctively
pleasant throughout.
Treats also evoke another dimension of experience relevant to habits. Having a
treat does not just happen; there is a decision to have a treat. As a result, there is a
temporal field underlying this event, connecting it with what precedes and follows the
actual (and typically brief) enjoyment of the treat. Thus a treat is not just the enjoyment of
a pleasure by itself but a subtle actualization and realization of self-knowledge surrounding
the temporality of the experience of this pleasure. In fact, the quality of the experience will
be affected if the pleasure is connected to the time frame covering the period before and
after the enjoyment of the treat.
According to the account in Parade, Rubin’s preferred treat is her favorite
perfume. Presumably then she would treat herself to a rationed amount of this substance as
a reward for any habit she was attempting to incorporate into her way of life. But what if the
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energy produced by the treat derives from an experience of precisely the kind of elements
which the acquisition of the habit intends to curtail and control?
Consumption of food is an obvious example (e.g., having a favorite dessert if one
is trying to reduce sweets and their attendant calories). In general, then, a treat could be
either like (the food example) or unlike (the perfume example) the elements of the conduct
defining the sought-after habit. But even if the treat is like the elements involved in the
establishment of a habit, it can also be seen as a morally justified experience. Here again,
self-knowledge becomes of fundamental importance. If, for example, the individual
realizes that he or she is subject to “binging” on something pleasant if deprived of any
of that kind of pleasure, then a treat will combine (a) the experience of a pleasure with (b)
the awareness that this experience, even if felt as only momentarily pleasant, will address the
connection between this kind of action (e.g., eating) and the need for restraint when in
the presence of food.
The factor of self-knowledge combined with a habit-seeker experiencing a treat
will illuminate the relevance of the conditions Aristotle imposes on a morally virtuous act.
For Aristotle, moral virtue requires experiences which are the mean between extremes.
Now a treat is optional; we may or may not choose to enjoy a treat while we work to
acquire a habit. But the conditions Aristotle identifies as elements in moral virtue can
readily be applied to the moral quality of a treat. Aristotle’s position emphasizes the
“rightness” of this energetic interlude based on the fact that it should happen (1) at the
right time—thus a treat should not be enjoyed one day after having gone on a diet; this is too
soon; (2) in the right way, i.e., not gloating about one’s success but appreciative of one’s
efforts—so far. Attaining good habits is hard work; whereas a treat looks backward in time
at past success, this achievement is only provisional and is no guarantee that the enjoyment
of a treat will energize one toward gaining the habit in one’s future actions and choices.
And finally (3) for the right motive; although enjoying the treat is indeed the “right” thing
to do and is “characteristic of virtue,” the individual experiencing the treat must be
motivated in terms of self-awareness to appreciate that this break in a sequence of
actions ordered in a regularly defined way should be understood in relation both to what
preceded it (all the actions devoted to instilling the habit) as well as what will follow it (the
resumption of these actions).
If, therefore, the achievement of the habit is successful—with arguably a
reduction in stress throughout this phase of the process—then treats become not a stopgap
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measure to forestall failure in the implementation of a habit but rather an integral step in the
process of achieving a desired end. Thus, it could be argued that treats should be “built into”
the regimen of establishing a habit not only to maintain one’s natural receptivity to pleasure
but also, and more importantly in this context, to provide a basic counterbalance to the
rigors involved in controlling one’s behavior, and one’s choices so that, in due course, the
desired habit has been formed. Should the treats continue after the habit has been
inculcated? The answer is yes and for at least two reasons: to help maintain this habit and
also to generate confidence that the present and ongoing success in such maintenance will
serve as a foundation, present in living memory (and reinforced by the occasional treat!) for
parallel success if and when the individual decides to pursue another change in habit,
regardless of the extent to which the type of behavior defining the proposed new habit is
similar to that of the habit already established.

V: “LIVING” PHILOSOPHY—SETTING THE SCENE
It may surely be assumed that any conclusion established in the name of moral theory would,
if realized in practical circumstances, produce salutary effects for those who act according
to its lights—e.g., Aristotle on moral virtue, Kant on duty, Mill on the greatest good for the
greatest number (the reader may add his or her favorite moral philosopher to this list). For
if this assumption once duly generalized were without such warrant, then any philosophical
theory (in ethics or other areas of philosophical inquiry) may be proffered with no concern
whatsoever whether its implementation would affect the practical matters that define the
lives of human beings–even, be it noted, philosophers themselves insofar as they exemplify
common humanity. Such a putative eventuality generates a fundamental gap—“chasm” is
perhaps more accurate—between the initial attractiveness a moral stance might exhibit
when asserted as pure theory and the typically “down and dirty” business of making
one’s moral way in the world.
Philosophers write, or at least they tend to do so. Socrates did not indulge himself
this way but he had literarily-minded contemporaries (some more friendly to him than
others). Of course, writing about how to lead one’s life remains...writing. Leading one’s life
is something else again. Hadot’s book aims to revivify what he claims is a lost sense of
living a certain kind of life, one which—based on ancient authors as models—can justifiably
be called “philosophical.” If contemporary readers are persuaded by Hadot’s thesis, they
remain only readers about how to lead a philosophical life—until, that is, they actually
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attempt to implement this approach within the concrete dimensions of their own lived
reality. During such periods, however, they cease reading about how to lead this kind
of life and actually live it. Furthermore, the individuals who will access and dwell
within the boundaries of this approach to human affairs are those aware of its existence
and feasibility. Who are these individuals? Only those with a philosophical bent, a
decidedly small segment of society and within that segment, only those who know about
Hadot’s approach, search out the relevant written sources, then make the effort to read and
absorb their contents.
The philosophical community, comprised almost exclusively of academicians,
may or may not be impressed with Hadot’s position to the point of attempting to realize it.
Note in this regard that to support his conjecture that the model of the living philosopher
can be resurrected in the contemporary world, Hadot cites (321–2fn8) five sources written
since 1985—all appearing in journals (and one book) aimed at academic philosophers. Who
will read this material? The high probability is only other academics. What will they do
upon reading it? Either try to refute it, roundly dismiss it, perhaps find it “interesting” then
do something else (moral or otherwise), or—the ideal for Hadot—take it to heart and try to
live its message, both in terms of their own lives and also, importantly, how they treat
others in light of this instilled “lived” wisdom. But even if every academic philosopher
were in fact to embrace this kind of life, a logically possible but existentially implausible
state of affairs, what about all those individuals outside the academy, some of whom,
indeed perhaps many, are thoughtful human beings leading their lives several worlds apart
from academic philosophy? Is it possible to convey Hadot’s renewed vision of the
philosophical life as lived—lived philosophy—to a broader, more inclusive audience?

VI: WELL, THERE’S WRITING AND THERE’S WRITING....
If Hadot’s sincere and engaging style begets only more writing of the same sort (inflected
perhaps with minor variations), then the audience for this moral message remains pitifully
small. What philosophers must do who not only admire Hadot’s work but also resolve
to advance its message into the actual business of living is “spread the word,” but not by
writing more words which only other academic philosophers will read (and react to in
variously fitting but limited professional modes). It seems incumbent as a methodological
prerequisite to instill in those who spend time writing academic philosophy the desire—the
habit, if you will—to develop their professional “love of wisdom” in ways which will reach
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non-academic audiences. Bluntly stated, the goal should be to write technical philosophy à
la self-help formats, to smooth out the original terminology of suitable moral masters and to
make its messages ingratiating to an audience actively seeking assistance in basic areas of
human concern.
Consider in this regard the feasibility of the “Axiom of Clarification”—i.e.,
regardless of the conceptual complexity which any philosophical position displays when
initially articulated, this position can be restated, clarified and stylistically broadened
without substantial loss of either basic meaning or theoretical rigor. If this axiom is taken to
heart, then the challenge is to address the range of topics established by dominant self-help
literature—such as Rubin on habits—and to write about those topics in ways which are
accessible to a “non-philosophical” audience lacking rehearsed analytic experience with
technical philosophical terminology and the rhythms of its reasoning, and also by executing
this writing with considerations illuminating those topics according to notions and
implications derived from the tradition’s philosophical “sages” (Hadot’s word).
The point is not that academic philosophers should in all their professional efforts
bow to the intricately blended (and occasionally mangled) complex demands of lived
practicality. This would never happen, of course, nor is it something that should happen.
Philosophers will continue to write primarily if not exclusively for other philosophers,
following the protocols for respectability and rigor that obtain within the many diverse,
pluralistic strains that currently characterize the discipline’s output of source material.
But if some philosophers pay attention to the fact that everyone has roughly the same
range of experiences—what Hume called “common life”—and if indeed philosophy is the
“love of wisdom” as the etymology of its name indicates, then the following
conclusions seem credible: At least some protagonists of philosophy should feel empathy
for the masses of mortals who consult the printed word for help in dealing with the knottier
elements of life. This shared humanity will then inspire philosophers to present their
professional labor in a form which will speak to people in ways derived from the seminal
sources of philosophical thought and which will also inspire and direct their actions.
Assume that these conclusions are realized within the philosophical
community—here is a simplified schematic sketching one way to proceed:
1.

Select an appropriate philosophical guide as a model and mentor for the
many—we assume that any of the great philosophers defining the
tradition of moral philosophy have thought and written with sufficient
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humanity and breadth to serve in this capacity.
2.

Identify areas of concern by reviewing popular self-help literature. The
number of sources is legion and the philosopher could readily select a
theme or slate of issues which he or she found interesting, important,
and worth sustained professional attention—quite apart from the
“lived” dimensions which these issues occupy for self-help readers (and
which the philosopher intends to affect in positive ways).

3.

Articulate the relevant coordinate position from the chosen philosophical
guide. The brief account of seminal areas from Aristotle’s Nicomachean
Ethics (section IV above) may stand as a working illustration of what a
philosopher could develop as a point of theoretical departure.

4.

Apply the results of Step 3 to the identifications made in Step 2. This
kind of writing will be challenging in at least two distinct but related
directions—(a) “translating” the selected philosophical positions into
accurately paraphrased prose and at the same time, (b) making it
accessible to a wide audience. The goal is to present this “popularized”
position within narrative or expository formats such that non-academic
readers will not only grasp the import of the original position but also
be sufficiently moved by its feasibility and attractiveness to incorporate
its recommendations into the fabric of their lives. During this phase of
the process, one might look for ways to reinforce analytical phases in the
formulation of the self-help agenda so that readers will be informed of
underlying theoretical points which could be readily transformed into
relevant practical action.

5.

Philosophers are naturally disputatious. Self-help literature will
seemingly present a variety of soft (if not attractively spongy)
argumentative targets. However, the point is not to dismember
conceptual weaknesses in self-help texts with the cavalier thrusts so
many academic philosophers relish when skewering and severing the
arguments of their peers, but to evaluate the descriptions of the settings
and advice delivered to the reader in a way which combines
sympathy and critical direction.
In addition, a practicing philosopher can look beyond the
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parameters of the immediate issues into regions of concern addressed and
illuminated by the original position. Such investigation may be
heuristically significant in revealing additional areas of moral relevance
not directly handled by the letter of the self-help account. For example,
in her book on habits, Rubin deploys human personality into four types:
Upholder, Questioner, Obliger, Rebel—based on tendencies exhibited by
those “in search of habit change.” An expansion of Rubin’s treatment of
habits might gather these types of personality as assumptions, so to
speak, and then investigate the more concerted reflections on happiness in
her two previous books. The four types are clearly intended as
paradigmatic in some respects; would it be possible to confront, e.g.,
aspects of Aristotle’s rich speculations on human nature with one, some
or all four of Rubin’s types and offer additional perspectives on her
inferences regarding each type as it theoretically grounds the quest for
habits?
6.

Producing such accounts will require a nice blend of layered
philosophical understanding and congenial rhetoric. But in a way, this
is the easy part of the philosopher’s mission. The tricky part is having
results see the light of day. The obvious publication strategy given the
intended audience will involve seeking outlets in the popular press, e.g.,
op-ed articles. And of course the blogosphere has generated enormous
possibilities for informing a computer-literate (but philosophically
unversed) audience of what a life inflected with philosophically derived
thoughts and practices has to offer. Technology beckons to any thinker
resident in the academy willing to heed its call.

POSTSCRIPT: HUME AND THE ANCIENTS ON “LIVED” PHILOSOPHIZING
It may happen that contemporary analytic philosophers, typically imbued with the
desirability for technical precision and rigor in their work, will be less receptive than their
stylistically more relaxed continental brethren to this plea for broadening the scope of the
philosophical enterprise. But stringent adherence to such rigidified methodology to the
exclusion of other possible approaches (and potential audiences) will cast them into a
realm where their work is divorced from ready accessibility. This professionalized
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isolation comes with consequences. In “Of the Different Species of Philosophy,” the first
section of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, hard-headed empiricist (and
spiritual father of analytic philosophy) David Hume writes:
The mere philosopher is a character, which is commonly but little
acceptable in the world, as being supposed to contribute nothing either to
the advantage or pleasure of society; while he lives remote from
communication with mankind, and is wrapped up in principles and
notions equally remote from their comprehension.
The eighteenth century Hume is much closer to our own time than the historically dim
figures read and discussed by Hadot, but if the description of the philosopher as
“wrapped up in principles and notions” to the point of living “remote from
communication with mankind” and contributing “nothing” to the advantage of society
stings at least a bit to contemporary sensibilities, then perhaps a reexamination of the public
goals of professional philosophy might be worth serious and sustained consideration,
regardless of ideological preferences and practices. In the end, it is a possibility the
implementation of which is worth pondering for all concerned with the practice and
dissemination of philosophy.

